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ABSTRACT
This paper will consider the right not to know in the
context of psychiatric disorders. It will outline the
arguments for and against acquiring knowledge about
the results of genetic testing for conditions such as
breast cancer and Huntington’s disease, and examine
whether similar considerations apply to disclosing to
clients the results of genetic testing for psychiatric
disorders such as depression and Alzheimer’s disease.
The right not to know will also be examined in the
context of the diagnosis of psychiatric disorders that are
associated with stigma or for which there is no effective
treatment.
INTRODUCTION
The ethical literature on the right not to know has
focused on the nature of genetic information and
its implications for autonomy, and on the
competing interests of family members when one
member of the family wishes to know the result of
genetic testing but others do not. In this paper, we
shall consider arguments for the right not to know
in the context of predictive genetic testing and
diagnosis, especially with respect to chronic
diseases (eg, schizophrenia), degenerative condi-
tions (eg, dementia) or disorders for which there is
no effective treatment (eg, psychopathy). A person
who learns to be at high risk of developing
a disorder that is stigmatised and associated with
a lifetime of struggle can suffer psychological harm
or discrimination. A person who is diagnosed with
such a disorder can lose hope and self-esteem and
thus compromise the successful management of his
or her symptoms. However, potential beneﬁts of
genetic and diagnostic information and marked
differences in people’s preferences and interests
suggest that there isn’ta‘right’ not to know in
psychiatry.
GENETIC TESTING AND THE RIGHT NOT TO KNOW:
ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST
Those who argue against the right not to know in
the context of genetic testing believe that knowing
one’s genetic status is an important aim in itself;
this is summed up by the phrase ‘knowledge is
power.’ They argue instead that there might be
a right or even a duty to know, or a duty to tell or
to warn other family members.
1 A duty to pass on
the information implies that knowing is in the best
interests of those who are told. A number of
possible reasons are given for this claim.
When we say, ‘knowledge is power’, we mean
that having knowledge is better than being in
a state of uncertainty. Underlying this claim is the
conviction that the more knowledge one has, the
more informed and effective decisions one can
make. Refusing to acquire knowledge about one self
is deemed by some to abdicate one’s duty to make
informed and reasonable autonomous decisions
about one’s own lifedand conversely that the right
not to know lacks justiﬁcation.
2 3 This presumes
a model of autonomy in which autonomy is
protected if the individual makes a choice based on
as much and as accurate information as possible;
Husted, discussing this issue, refers to it as a ‘thin
conception of autonomy’.
4
Choosing not to know is regarded as an ethical
problem and as a practical problem, as it arguably
limits the capacity to plan for the future and
manage future symptoms. Even if there is no
treatment or cure, this does not mean that there are
no lifestyle changes or choices that follow from
knowing whether or not one will (in the case of
a dominant gene disorder such as Huntington’s
disease (HD)) or is likely to (if one tests positive for
BRCA1 or BRCA2) develop a particular illness, for
instance, choices concerning one’s employment,
reproduction and ﬁnancial situation.
Finally, choosing not to know may impact
negatively on the interests of third parties: repro-
ductive decisions may not be well informed, and
family members may be prevented from making
their own testing and lifestyle decisions. Preventing
others from having access to this information is
deemed so important that some have argued that
individuals should not be able to keep the results of
genetic tests private, but should share information
with family. Accordingly, family models, rather
than the usual practices of individual consent and
conﬁdentiality, have been suggested to manage
genetic testing within families: for instance, the
‘joint account’ model and the ‘family covenant’.
5 6
Set against these arguments are competing
claims about the right not to know; these can be
summed up by the phrase ‘ignorance is bliss.’ The
idea is that knowing does not in fact add to the
quality of life, but reduces it. For instance, even
while still in good health, one might behave or be
treated by others as if one were already ill, and thus
become the ‘worried well’, extending the deﬁnition
of illness beyond those who feel ill and exhibit
symptoms to those who are at risk.
While those who argue for the right to know
argue that knowledge is necessary for autonomy,
their opponents argue that autonomy is precisely
what grounds the right not to know.
7 The idea is
that one’s autonomy might be protected by one’s
refusal to obtain genetic information because one is
ensured an ‘open future’.
8 The idea is that knowing
the probability of developing a certain disorder in
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Ethicsthe future compromises one’s quality of life and conditions one’s
choices. That an ‘open future’ is something that some individ-
uals value is conﬁrmed by the lower-than-expected uptake of the
test for HD. For instance, ‘prior to the availability of a predictive
test of HD, 57e84% of at-risk individuals indicated an interest
in the test’ (p 463),
9 but in fact uptake of the test is less than
20%.
91 0Those who argue that the right not to know is
compatible with and grounded by autonomy deploy what
Husted calls a ‘thick conception of autonomy’dautonomy
understood as an activity of ‘self-creation’ (p 61).
4
A further consideration in support of the right not to know
is that if there is no treatment available or preventive measures
that can be taken, the beneﬁts of knowing are outweighed
by the harms of knowing; these may include stigma, discrimi-
nation in employment and psychological harm. The psycho-
logical effects of genetic diagnosis are not clear, and there is no
consensus about what is most beneﬁcial in terms of psycho-
logical well-being. However, some research has been done on
people who are told that they may develop a disease such as
breast cancer or HD. Predictably, people whose tests are positive
tend to experience more distress than people whose tests are
negative, but distress usually remains in the normal range, and
does not lead to either suicide or high levels of anxiety or
depression. When levels of anxiety increase, they return to
normal in a relatively short time.
11 12 One exception is consti-
tuted by people who learn that they will not develop a certain
disease, but members of their family have or are likely to develop
the same disease. Symptoms of anxiety and depression are
observed in this case, as a form of ‘survivor guilt’. It is of course
open to those who expect to experience negative effects, such as
feeling depressed or suicidal, not to take the test.
13 Interestingly,
for some people, knowing (even in case of positive results) is less
distressing than living in uncertainty. For others, uncertainty is
preferable, and the exceptionally low uptake of the HD test is
particularly signiﬁcant in this respect.
RISKS AND BENEFITS OF GENETIC TESTING FOR SOME
PSYCHIATRIC DISORDERS
Can the arguments above apply to psychiatry? Not many
psychiatric disorders have known genetic basesdfor instance,
the bases for dementia and autism are better known than those
for schizophrenia, depression and bipolar disorder. As Laegsgaard
et al
14 say, ‘the aetiology of mental illnesses has shown to be
polygenic and multifactorial, complicating both the research
seeking to identify risk genes and the interpretation of genetic
test results’ (p 2). In spite of these difﬁculties, it is likely that
more genetic tests will become available, and it is important to
ask whether they are likely to bring beneﬁts. On the one hand,
knowledge of the vulnerability to a certain psychiatric disorder
can inform prevention and treatment. On the other hand, the
very same knowledge can cause psychological harm or lead to
discrimination.
Let’s consider two examples of genetic testing for psychiatric
disorders, depression and Alzheimer’s disease. Depression is
manifested in feelings of sadness experienced over a long period
of time and interfering with social functioning. It can be trig-
gered by stressful life events, illness, alcohol and drug misuse,
isolation, giving birth. Depression ‘runs in families’: if one has
a biological parent having depression, then one’s chances of
developing depression are threefold. Research is being done into
the genetic aspects of depression, and the ﬁrst tests have
been proposed. Newson
15 discusses the ethical implications of 5-
HTT testing that has been available for some time and is
used both pre-symptomatically and as an aid to diagnosis.
Laegsgaard et al
14 conducted structured interviews with a small
sample of people with depression who had participated in
genetic research.
Participants reported an altruistic motivation for participating
(‘genetic research may make no difference to me, but may
impact positively on future generations’). The case of genetic
testing for HD case showed positive attitudes towards the test
before it was developed, but this did not translate into a large
uptake of the test when it became available. The situation might
be different in the case of depression, as Newson
15 observes:
‘Nearly two-thirds of Wilhelm et al.’s cohort consented to the 5-
HTT genetic test; a higher rate than that observed for single-
gene conditions such as Huntington’s disease. This result is
consistent with studies that predicted high levels of interest in
psychiatric genetic testing’ (p 189). Some results suggest positive
attitudes towards having more information in the case of
depression. For instance, participants in the study by Laegsgaard
et al
14 reported that after the testing, there was greater discus-
sion within the family and increased awareness of depression as
a genuine psychiatric disorder rather than a character fault. This
was useful in helping sufferers understand depression as
a ‘disorder’, and it was also psychologically beneﬁcial as it
allowed sufferers not to feel blame or responsibility.
Less positive effects were also reported: there was increased
concern about family members who were perceived as ‘at risk’,
but had not yet fully developed the condition and might never
do so (an example of the creation of a population of ‘worried
well’). Another common attitude among those not favourable to
testing was the sense that the genetic tests were useless because
they could not directly contribute to treatmentdwhich parallels
general concerns about the purpose of testing. A general worry is
that people may become more prone to depressions as a result of
being told that they are at risk of developing depression. As
Chadwick
16 says, ‘In the case of mental disorders, there may be
additional factors associated with self-fulﬁlling prophecy of
a predisposition to, for example, depression’ (p 36). Stigma and
discrimination were also discussed, and the most common result
was that a better understanding of the genetic aetiology of
depression could reduce the stigma associated with the condi-
tion, at least in the individual sufferer and his or her family. As
one of the participants said, “Knowing that depression is
a disease has helped medbut I don’t see this happening in the
society. To other people is still a matter of pulling oneself
together” (p 7).
14 This shows that testing can promote knowl-
edge about a psychiatric condition and decrease stigma among
those who obtain such knowledge. In the wider societal context,
although, discrimination remains a danger.
Alzheimer’s disease is a common form of dementia and
involves impaired cognition, especially memory loss. It is
degenerative, so patients worsen as time goes by until they stop
functioning socially (eg, they cannot engage in conversation).
Although it is commonly regarded as a disease of old age, there
are also forms of early-onset Alzheimer’s, which manifest at 40
or 50 years of age.
17 Healthy people who have relatives afﬂicted
by Alzheimer’s disease may be genetically tested, but at the
moment, it is possible only to predict the development of early-
onset versions of the disease that are caused by mutations in
single genes called APP, PS1 and PS2. As there are early-onset
forms of the disease that are not caused by such mutations,
genetic testing may not be able to predict half of the
relevant cases. For late-onset Alzheimer’s, the genes responsible
have not been reliably identiﬁed yet, but increased risk has been
observed in the presence of the gene apolipoprotein E. Inheriting
the gene does not guarantee that one will develop Alzheimer’s
674 J Med Ethics 2011;37:673e676. doi:10.1136/jme.2010.041111
Ethicsdisease. A blood test to detect apolipoprotein E is available, but
at this stage it cannot be reliably used to predict an individual’s
risk factor.
18 19
As there is no cure or effective treatment for Alzheimer’s
disease, it has been argued that the beneﬁts of knowing that
the disease will strike are limited.
20 One possible beneﬁti s
that people who are predicted to have a higher risk of developing
the disease can reduce such a risk by adopting a healthier
lifestyle (eg, by taking vitamins and exercising). Another
beneﬁt consists in the possibility for forward planning, but
this beneﬁt is constrained by the uncertainty surrounding
the results of the currently available testing. In a study by
Roberts et al,
21 people whose parents had been affected by the
disease were contacted and asked whether they wanted genetic
susceptibility testing. Of the people contacted, 24% opted for
testing and provided a variety of reasons for their choice, from
desiring to contribute to research and hoping in the future
development of effective treatment to wanting to plan for long-
term care. In a survey, Neumann et al
22 found that a high
percentage of the general population would choose to take
a genuinely predictive genetic test for Alzheimer’s disease
(79%), but interest would fall dramatically for a test that was
only partially predictive. The main reason for wanting to know
about the risk to develop the disease was, again, advance plan-
ning (eg, sign advance directives, get insurance, prepare ﬁnan-
cially). The results of this survey suggest that people do value
genetic testing if the resulting information is accurate enough to
allow for planning.
We saw that many of the general arguments for and against
genetic testing also apply to psychiatric disorders with
(partially) known genetic bases. One thing to notice is that the
difﬁculties in tracking the aetiology of some forms of mental
illness make predictive testing unreliable and thus reduce its
potential beneﬁts. Moreover, the fact that psychiatric disorders
such as depression and dementia are often accompanied by
stigma and discrimination can be used to support or oppose
predictive testing. On the one hand, awareness of the genetic
origins of some disorders reinforces the idea that abnormal
behaviour is not something to be blamed for but the symptom
of a disease. On the other hand, when conﬁdentiality is not
respected, knowledge that one is at high risk of developing
a certain disorder can give rise to discrimination (eg, by
insurance companies or employers).
Finally, in conditions such as HD and breast cancer, the
rights and interests of third parties offer a reason against
the right not to know as genetic information is ‘shared’
or ‘family’ information.
23 Genetics shifts the focus from the
individual to the group,
24 25 and the focus of communal
models of ethics is solidarity, not the protection of individual
privacy.
26 This line of reasoning applies to psychiatric disorders
with known genetic bases, but seems far less relevant to
psychiatric disorders that have no known genetic bases as family
members would not be prevented from acquiring important
information about themselves if the right not to know were
upheld.
THE RIGHT NOT TO KNOW IN PSYCHIATRIC DIAGNOSIS
As we saw in Introduction, both those who defend and chal-
lenge the right not to know appeal to considerations about
autonomy, and these seem just as relevant to psychiatric diag-
nosis and prognosis as to genetic testing. For instance, one could
argue that the client should always be informed about her
diagnosis (1) out of respect for autonomy, (2) to preserve trust in
the doctor/client relationship, (3) in recognition of the reciprocal
obligations of doctor and client and (4) to understand and
manage her symptoms.
However, there also seem to be reasons for not telling the
whole truth, particularly when the diagnosed disorder is asso-
ciated with stigma, irreversibility and lack of effective treat-
ment. Anecdotally, clinicians report that there is disagreement
about whether it is appropriate to disclose a diagnosis of
schizophrenia to clients, as schizophrenia is stigmatised as
a chronic disorder. Initially, some clinicians prefer to talk about
‘psychotic episodes’, because reference to symptoms suggests
that the condition is not necessarily there to stay. Clients are
told nothing strictly speaking false, but only half of the truth, in
order to ‘protect’ their self-esteem and sustain their will to
recover. The idea is that knowledge of diagnosis and prognosis
can make things worse for the client when the disorder is
commonly stigmatised as untreatable or irreversible, and doctors
should privilege the success of therapeutic interventions over
other considerations. In a forthcoming paper, Rachel Cooper
argues that people diagnosed with psychopathy soon realise that
their condition is not easily treatable, and knowledge of their
diagnosis has no positive effects on them.
Another reason to withhold information emerges in the
context of disorders that impair cognitive functioningdclients
may be unable to fully understand the information given to
them or be motivated not to know. Non-disclosure is often the
standard practice when it comes to dementia. In the available
surveys, it is observed that progressively less information is
given to clients who have more severe dementia. Interestingly,
although relatives often prefer for the diagnosis not to be
disclosed to clients, there is some evidence that most people
(92% in the study by Erde et al
27 on Alzheimer’s disease) would
prefer to be told the truth. Marzanski
28 interviewed 30 clients
with dementia and found that almost 50% of them had good
insight into their condition (eg, they knew they had serious
problems with memory), but 20 had never been told about their
illness by doctors or family members, although nurses and
friends had passed some information onto them (p 109).
Twenty-one out of 30 clients expressed a desire for more infor-
mation and were especially interested in the possibility of
recovery. Conversely, nine clients said they did not want any
additional information about their illness, but the motivation
was not always the same: some already had full insight and did
not see the need for an ofﬁcial diagnosis and others were simply
in denial.
Although it is based on a limited sample, this study shows
signiﬁcant personal differences in the preferences people have
with respect to knowing their conditiondsome want the
opportunity to know about their diagnosis and others prefer not
to know. This study also shows that there are some similarities
between information about predictive testing and information
about diagnosis: the information is regarded as more valuable
if it has implications for lifestyle choices or possibility for
treatment.
CONCLUSIONS
There are two common threads in the current debates on the
right not to know: (1) genetic information brings both beneﬁts
and costs and (2) there can be marked individual differences in
the interests people have in obtaining such information and in
their psychological reaction to it. As shown by the variety of
attitudes towards genetic testing for depression and towards
the diagnosis of dementia, some people prefer to know and
other people prefer not to know, especially when no effective
treatment is available.
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EthicsWe considered the view that when one’s diagnosis of schizo-
phrenia or dementia can compromise the management of
symptoms, there are reasons for non-disclosure. However, not all
circumstances would equally support an interest in not
knowing. While it might be important for some people not to
know the details of their diagnosis in order for them to coop-
erate with healthcare professionals and family members and be
treated successfully, it is difﬁcult to justify the decision to keep
a diagnosis from clients when everybody else around them
knows about it. Would non-disclosure be a responsible decision
made for therapeutic reasons or an instance of deception?
A preliminary conclusion, then, is that it is important to
consider people’s interests in knowing and not knowing when it
comes to psychiatric or other disorders, but it seems inappro-
priate to regard such interests as the bases of ‘rights’ to be
upheld in all the relevant circumstances.
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